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SHADY GROVE, THE RULES ENABLING
ACT, AND THE APPLICATION OF STATE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS IN
FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASES
MATTHEW R. LYON'
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago, the United States Supreme Court's
plurality opinion in Celotex Corp. v. Catrettl and the other two
cases in the "Celotex trilogy"2 breathed new life into summary
judgment as a method of disposing of civil cases without trial in
the federal courts. Although most states have adopted
procedural rules for civil actions that are based upon the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, not all state courts have chosen to
follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 in Celotex. Notwithstanding similarities between
the language of Rule 56 and corresponding state summary
judgment rules, several states have interpreted their own rules
more restrictively than the Celotex plurality construed the
federal rule.3 As a result, it is more difficult in those states for a
moving party to obtain dismissal at the summary judgment stage
in state court than it is in federal court.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of
Law. Many thanks to Judy Cornett for her insightful comments on a previous draft
of this Article.
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
2 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
' See, e.g., Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2008)
(interpreting TENN. R. CIV. P. 56); see also Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of
Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994) (interpreting IND. TRIAL R. 56(C));
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Ky. 1991)
(interpreting KY. CR 56.03).
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The conventional wisdom to date has been that the federal
summary judgment standard applies in federal court regardless
of the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.4  Some
commentators are skeptical that federal courts would ever apply
state summary judgment standards in diversity cases,' while
others have been more open to the idea.' This Article argues that
where the state standard for adjudicating a motion for summary
judgment differs from the Celotex standard, the most rational
outcome by a federal court applying the modern vertical choice-
of-law doctrine that has evolved through Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,' Hanna v. Plumer, and their progeny, including, most
recently, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,' is to apply the state standard.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the relevant history
of the Erie doctrine, including its origins in both the Rules of
Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act, and concludes with a
discussion of Shady Grove, the latest landmark in the Supreme
Court's Erie jurisprudence. Part II summarizes the summary
judgment standards in federal and state courts, highlighting how
certain state courts have distinguished their summary judgment
rules from the interpretation of the federal rule set forth in
Celotex. Part III argues that, based upon the controlling
precedent from Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in Shady
Grove, the federal court should apply the state standard. A
district court could reach this outcome through either a Rules
Enabling Act analysis or, less likely, a Rules of Decision Act
analysis. In fact, the results of several lower court decisions
applying Shady Grove suggest that the case has revived the
See, e.g., Shropshire v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 550 F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir. 2008)
(stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies "even where the federal
summary judgment requirements displace state law that would require a jury to
make a particular determination").
6 See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 987, 1035 (2011) ("Because Rule 56 really treats procedure and it
covers the standard of decision, it applies in any diversity case to displace state law
that covers the same matter.").
6 See Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Summary Judgment in the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON
L. REV. 1245, 1257-58 (2010); Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And
What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 245, 282-83 (2008).
7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
9 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
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possibility that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that otherwise
controls the issue in dispute might be invalidated under the
Rules Enabling Act. A lasting-and perhaps unintended-legacy
of the fractured Shady Grove case, therefore, may be that it has
opened the door to the increased application of state rules-and,
potentially, state summary judgment standards-by federal
courts sitting in diversity. The Court's steady shift towards the
procedural disposition of suits in the federal courts10 and the
concomitant pushback in the state courts" make this an area
ripe for further development of the Court's Erie jurisprudence.
I. VERTICAL CHOICE-OF-LAW DECISIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS
SITTING IN DIVERSITY
The Erie doctrine has long been a favorite source for
criticism among the legal commentariat.12 Professor Rowe has
opined that this steady stream of chatter may be due to the fact
that "this area combines inherent complexity and interest while
being a key part of the rite of passage through which most of us
went and continue to put our students."1 3 The modern Erie
doctrine towers over the civil procedure landscape like a mighty
1 Summary judgment is certainly not the only area in which the Supreme
Court's interpretation of procedural rules has promoted the pre-trial disposition of
civil suits. See, for example, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009), and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), both adopting a higher
pleading standard of plausibility when considering whether a complaint should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
" Like the state courts that have rejected Celotex, several state courts have
declined to adopt the plausibility standard when presented with that opportunity.
See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 347 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc); Colby
v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008); McCurry v. Chevy Chase
Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863-64 (Wash. 2010) (en banc). But see Doe v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 788 N.W.2d 264, 274-78 (Neb. 2010) (adopting the
plausibility standard in state court); see also Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888
N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 2008); Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 808-09 (S.D.
2008).
12 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else
Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna
Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 963-64 (1998) (observing that "much
of the law review commentary on the Court's Erie decisions has been critical-and
sometimes deservedly so"); Steinman, supra note 6, at 247 & n.3 (citing secondary
sources and commenting that "Erie has achieved a mythic status, and. . . has been a
constant subject of scholarly debate and analysis").
1s Rowe, supra note 12, at 1015.
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oak tree with two root systems that had separate origins but are
now intertwined. These two sets of roots are the Rules of
Decision Act ("RDA") and the Rules Enabling Act ("REA").
A. The Rules of Decision Act Cases
The Erie doctrine has its genesis in efforts by the Supreme
Court to interpret the older of the two statutes, the RDA, which
can be traced back to section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.14
The RDA's vague instruction that federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction are to regard "[tihe laws of the several
states" as "rules of decision" in federal civil actions left
much open to interpretation. The Supreme Court's original
interpretation of the RDA, of course, was that the phrase "laws of
the several states" encompassed state statutes, rules, and "long-
established local customs," but not the decisions of state courts,
which were, "at most, only evidence of what the laws are,
and.. . not, of themselves, laws."" After the mandate in Swift to
follow principles of general commercial law, rather than the
common law of the forum state,'" the federal courts were free to
"exercise an independent judgment as to what the common law of
[a] state is-or should be."" The resulting inconsistencies
between the federal and state courts, and among the federal
courts, led to increasing criticism of the Swift rule and eventually
gave rise to the legal realism movement, which found its most
prominent voice with Justice Holmes's dissent in Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co." In Erie, the Court deemed the Swift rule unconstitutional
14 "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
1 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842).
16 Id. at 19.
1 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). "Swift created a topsy-turvy
world in diversity cases-federal, not state, substantive law was applied, but state,
not federal, procedure governed." JoEllen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex
Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717,
731 (2004).
18 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Liaw in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The
common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is
not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of
that State . . . .").
[Vol. 85:10111014
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and abandoned the concept of the federal general common law,
which, in the Court's view, "invaded rights ... reserved by the
Constitution to the several states." 9
Erie's instructions as to when federal courts should apply
state or federal law were less than clear. The Court's mandate
that "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a state"2 0 was easy enough to follow
where, as in Erie, the state law in question was obviously
substantive. 2 1  As Justice Reed observed in his concurrence,
however, "[t]he line between procedural and substantive law is
hazy."2 2 It was clear after Erie that federal courts sitting in
diversity should apply state substantive law, whether created by
state statute or common law, yet all agreed that the federal
courts retained power over procedure.23 The question remained
as to how to distinguish between the two.
The Court endeavored to answer this question in two
significant post-Erie cases. In Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York,24 Justice Frankfurter wrote that by "overrul[ing] a
particular way of looking at [the] law,"25 Erie evinced an intent to
ensure in federal diversity cases that "the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same,
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it
9 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80.
20 Id. at 78.
21 The plaintiff in Erie, Mr. Tompkins, was injured by a passing train while
walking along the right-of-way adjacent to the railroad tracks. Id. at 69. The issue in
controversy in the case was the duty owed by the railroad to individuals on its right-
of-way. The railroad asserted that the court should apply Pennsylvania common law,
under which individuals on a railroad right-of-way were trespassers to whom the
railroad was not liable for injuries resulting from its negligence. Mr. Tompkins
responded that because there was no state statute governing the duty owed by
railroads to individuals walking along their rights-of-way, federal common law
principles of negligence should apply, and he should be treated as an invitee to
whom the railroad owed a duty of care. Id. at 70. The lower courts, applying Swift,
had agreed with Mr. Tompkins.
22 Id. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring in part).
2 Id. at 91-92 ("If the opinion commits this Court to the position that the
Congress is without power to declare what rules of substantive law shall govern the
federal courts, that conclusion. . . seems questionable. . . . EN]o one doubts federal
power over procedure.").
24 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
25 Id. at 101.
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would be if tried in a [s]tate court."26 York's "outcome-
determinative test" required federal courts not to simply
decide whether a particular legal issue is "substantive"
or "procedural," but rather to inquire whether it would
"significantly affect the result of a litigation" if the federal court
were to disregard a state law that would control an action
involving the same parties and the same cause of action in state
court.2 8 If so, then it was incumbent upon the court to apply the
law of the state. The Court in York seemed guided by the
purpose behind federal diversity jurisdiction-to assure "non-
resident litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential
local bias"-and the fundamental unfairness of permitting those
litigants to take advantage of not only "another tribunal," but
"another body of law."29  The advance of the York outcome-
determinative test witnessed its high-water mark with the
release of three Supreme Court decisions on the same day in
1949, each of which mandated the application of a state law
instead of an arguably conflicting federal standard."
26 Id. at 108-09 ("[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in effect, only
another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made
unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right
as given by the State.").
27 In York, the issue was whether to apply a state statute of limitations or the
equitable doctrine of laches followed in the federal courts. Id. at 108.
28 Id. at 109.
29 Id. at 111-12; see also id. at 109 ("The nub of the policy that underlies Erie
[R.R] Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a
non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a [sitate court a block away,
should not lead to a substantially different result.").
3o See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (applying a
New Jersey statute requiring Plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits owning less
than a specified percentage of the corporation's stock to post bond instead of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which does not require such a bond for federal class
actions); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531 n.1 (1949)
(applying a Kansas law requiring that process be served within the statutory period
in order to toll the limitations period rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3,
which provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court"); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (holding that a
Mississippi "door closing" statute, which prohibited out-of-state corporations doing
business in the state from suing in state court unless they had first consented to
service within the state, also prohibited suits by such corporations in federal district
court in Mississippi).
1016 [Vol. 85:1011
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Thirteen years after York, the Court's decision in Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.31 represented a
reassertion of federal interests, at least when the interest in
question is the right to jury trial in federal court. Describing the
outcome-determinative test as dispositive only "in the absence of
other considerations,"3 2 Justice Brennan wrote that where there
are "affirmative countervailing considerations at work," a
balancing test is required to ensure that essential federal
interests are protected. 3 Thus, the relatively straightforward
outcome-determinative test of York was qualified by the caveat
that courts consider the importance of the policies behind the
competing state and federal rules before determining which to
apply.
If the Court's interpretation of the RDA was far from a model
of clarity after Byrd 34 the vertical choice-of-law decision would
only be further muddled by a parallel line of cases that presented
an alternative method of determining whether federal or state
law should apply.
B. The Rules Enabling Act Cases
The REA, enacted by Congress in 1934, represented the
culmination of decades of activism for a simplified system of
procedure that merged the courts of law and equity at the federal
level.35 The REA conferred upon the Supreme Court "the power
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of
evidence for cases in" the federal "district courts,"" subject to the
restriction that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
31 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
* Id. at 536.
* Id. at 537-38. The application of the balancing test in Byrd resulted in
following the federal law because the "strong federal policy against allowing state
rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts" outweighed "the
interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way in
the federal court and another way in the state court." Id. at 538-39.
" Byrd "exhibits a confusion that exceeds even that normally surrounding a
balancing test, and lower courts understandably experienced considerable difficulty
in applying it." John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693,
709 (1974).
" See Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 288, 299-300; Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The
Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules:
Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1308-09 (2006).
36 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
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any substantive right."3 ' This broad power led most concretely,
of course, to the development of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which became law in 1938.38 The Supreme Court had
one of its first opportunities to interpret the scope of the REA
only a few years later in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co." Sibbach filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois seeking redress for bodily injuries that she had
allegedly suffered in Indiana.4 0 Illinois common law prohibited
courts from ordering physical examinations of plaintiffs who filed
suits for damages for physical injuries, while Indiana common
law permitted such examinations.4 1 While Sibbach's suit was
pending, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect.42
Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, the court ordered
Sibbach to submit to a physical examination, and when she
refused to comply, it held her in contempt, ostensibly under the
authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.43 In her appeal
to the Supreme Court, Sibbach admitted that Rules 35 and 37
were procedural rules but argued that applying them in the face
" Id. § 2072(b). While this Article focuses primarily on the effect of Federal Rule
56 on "substantive rights" that have been granted to litigants by states, specifically
those conferred through the adoption of separate summary judgment standards, a
number of commentators have argued that "the primary purpose of the Enabling
Act's procedure/substance dichotomy is to allocate prospective federal lawmaking
between the Supreme Court and Congress, not to protect lawmaking choices already
made, and certainly not to protect state lawmaking choices exclusively." Stephen B.
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady
Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 43 (2010); see also Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to
Jurisdiction as a "Substantive Right": The Invalidity of Rule 4(k) Under the Rules
Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 1201 (2000) (citing Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1113-15 (1982)). In the views of these
scholars, any protection that § 2072(b) provides to federalism concerns is ancillary to
the provision's chief purpose: "preventing the Supreme Court, exercising delegated
legislative power to promulgate court rules, from encroaching upon Congress's
lawmaking prerogatives." Burbank & Wolff, supra, at 44. In other words, Congress
intended through § 2072(b) to "retain[] for itself the power to make primary policy
decisions, including those that involve the displacement of state substantive law."
Kelleher, supra.
3 Redish & Amuluru, supra note 35, at 1310.
39 312 U.S. 1 (1941). For an extended discussion of Sibbach, see Allan Ides, The
Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady
Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041
(2011).
40 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6.
41 Id. at 6-7.
42 See Ides, supra note 39, at 1051-52.
" Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6-9.
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of Illinois's policy against physical examinations violated the
REA's mandate that a federal "court shall not abridge, enlarge,
nor modify the substantive rights."" Her argument defined a
"substantive" right as an important or substantial right and
reasoned that the federal rules, by permitting a physical
examination of a plaintiff filing suit to recover damages for bodily
injuries, abridged the substantive right not to submit to an
examination that was granted by Illinois law.45
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, made the non-
controversial observation that the REA "was purposely restricted
in its operation to matters of pleading and court practice and
procedure."4 While the Court reaffirmed that a federal "court
shall not 'abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights', in
the guise of regulating procedure," it also declined Sibbach's
invitation to construe the term "substantive" broadly and
prohibit procedural rules from affecting "important and
substantial rights theretofore recognized."" Instead, the Court
set the test for whether a rule is procedural, and thus within the
power that Congress granted to the Court under the RDA, to be
"whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
1 Id. at 10-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Id. at 11; see also Ides, supra note 39, at 1053 ("[A]ccording to [Sibbach's]
argument, the abridge-enlarge-modify limitation of the REA precluded the federal
district court from promulgating a rule that revised an important or substantial
right.").
46 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10. This statement has been criticized as "devoid of
supportive reasoning" and as revealing "the Court's fatally simplistic understanding
of the substance-procedure distinction." Redish & Amuluru, supra note 35, at 1327-
28.
17 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10.
" Id. at 13-14 ("Recognized where and by whom? ... If we were to adopt the
suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged right we should invite endless
litigation and confusion worse confounded.").
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infraction of them."4 9 Because Sibbach had admitted that Rules
35 and 37 "really regulate[d] procedure," the Court applied those
federal rules.o
Sibbach, then, upheld the application of a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure established by the REA in the face of a seemingly
conflicting state practice without citing to Erie at all. Sibbach
and other cases interpreting the REA were difficult to reconcile
with the Erie line of cases interpreting the RDA, particularly
York's outcome-determinative test and subsequent decisions that
had favored state rules over federal rules of procedure. As Chief
Justice Warren observed in Hanna v. Plumer,
[tihe broad command of Erie was ... identical to that of the
Enabling Act: federal courts are to apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law. However, as subsequent cases
sharpened the distinction between substance and procedure, the
line of cases following Erie diverged markedly from the line
construing the Enabling Act."
Hanna provided the opportunity to merge these two lines of cases
into one coherent rule.52
C. Hanna and the Modern Erie Doctrine
The Court in Hanna faced a standard Erie dilemma: whether
to apply the state or federal rule concerning the method of service
of process. An Ohio citizen filed suit in federal court in
Massachusetts against a Massachusetts citizen for injuries
stemming from an automobile accident in South Carolina." If
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)-now Rule 4(e)-applied,
the method of service was proper, but if the Massachusetts law
regarding service controlled, service was improper and the suit
" Id. at 14. In the wake of the renewed reliance on Sibbach by the Shady Grove
plurality, Sibbach's narrow interpretation of the term "substantive rights" has been
criticized as "out of touch with the way in which law was made and applied in the
United States." Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 33. Interestingly, although the
Court made a clear statement in Sibbach as to what a "substantive right" is not, it
left the term undefined. As discussed in Part I.D below and at length in Ides, supra
note 39, the scope of "substantive rights," and thus the reach of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b),
was the focus of the debate between Justices Scalia and Stevens in Shady Grove.
o Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
5" See Hanna v. Pluiner, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
52 For this reason, Hanna has been referred to as "arguably the most significant
Erie-doctrine decision of the last seventy years." Steinman, supra note 6, at 260.
" Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461.
5 Id.
1020 [Vol. 85:1011
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would be dismissed." The Court held that Rule 4(d)(1) was "the
standard against which the District Court should have measured
the adequacy of the service."" Far more influential than the
holding, however, was the analysis that Chief Justice Warren
undertook to reach it.
The Court first engaged in a traditional Erie analysis under
the RDA. Citing Byrd, the Court wrote that the outcome-
determinative analysis of York "was never intended to serve as
a talisman." Rather, that test could not "be read without
reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws."5' The Court in Hanna thus adopted a modified
outcome-determinative test, which views the differences between
the federal and state laws from an ex ante perspective. Rather
than considering whether the competing rules will result in a
different outcome-as countless procedural rules will-courts are
to look toward whether the competing rules are so different as to
either encourage a litigant to file suit in one forum over the other
or substantially alter the mode of enforcement of state-created
rights."
After discussing the RDA line of cases, the Court turned its
attention to the REA line. It made clear that a state law should
be applied over a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in federal court
only where the scope of the Federal Rule can be interpreted
narrowly enough so as not to control the disputed issue in the
case."0 If the federal rule covers the legal controversy, however,
"the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical,
relatively unguided Erie [c]hoice" that had been described in the
first part of the Court's opinion." Instead, when the federal rule
" Id. at 461-62.
56 Id. at 464.
6 Id. at 466-67.
58 Id. at 468.
* Id. at 469. Moreover, the discussion of "the importance of a state rule" in
footnote nine of Hanna seems to fold Byrd's balancing test into York's outcome-
determination test. Id. at 468 n.9.
60 Id. at 470.
61 Id. at 471.
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controls, the court must apply the federal rule unless it exceeds
the power to regulate all procedure in the federal court granted
by the REA or constitutional restrictions.6 2
After Hanna, then, the steps in the modern Erie analysis are
clear. The threshold question is whether the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure controls the issue in dispute before the court. If
the Federal Rule is in conflict or "direct collision" with the state
standard, then the court must apply the federal law as long as it
does not run afoul of the Constitution or exceed the power that
Congress granted to the courts under the REA, meaning that it is
"arguably procedural" and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify a
substantive state right.6 ' This analysis has been expanded to
include federal procedural statutes, which, if controlling, will
apply over competing state laws if they do not exceed the
constitutional boundaries-that is, if they are "arguably
procedural."' If there is no federal rule or statute that controls
the issue in dispute, or if the competing federal standard is a
judge-made doctrine, then the court should employ the "modified"
or "unguided" Erie analysis. This requires application of the
state law if doing so would further Erie's "twin aims" of avoiding
forum shopping and preventing the inequitable administration of
laws."
As might be expected, the decision regarding whether to
apply federal or state law has, since Hanna, been heavily
influenced by the threshold question of how broadly a court is
willing to interpret the relevant federal rule or statute." Where
the federal rule or statute has been deemed to cover or control
the issue in dispute, courts have almost exclusively applied it.
62 Id.; see also id. at 473-74 ("To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights
would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal
procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act.").
63 Id. at 471-72; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
* Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988).
6 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
* See Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 879
(2011) ("As Shady Grove shows, the initial 'characterization question'-whether a
case falls on the Enabling Act or the Erie side of the line-can lack a clear answer.").
As a prelude to his recommendation for a new approach to distinguishing matters of
substance and procedure, Professor Tidmarsh argues that while "[ilt is far too early
to sing a requiem for Hanna[, ... Shady Grove exposes the ease of manipulating
Hanna's framework, the contested nature of the framework itself, and the Court's
ever veering course in applying the framework in real-world contexts." Id. at 880.
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Indeed, "[t]he Supreme Court has never invalidated a Federal
Rule for violation of the Act's 'substantive right' limitation,"67 and
the idea that the jurisdictional limitation language in § 2072(b)
might be used to invalidate a federal rule or statute has been
argued, by some, to be purely conceptual.6 8 In three major cases
that followed Hanna, however, the Court showed a willingness to
defer to the state law by interpreting the federal rule or statute
in question narrowly and, in so doing, resorting to the modified
outcome-determinative test, or unguided Erie analysis.
First, in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,6 the Court considered
whether its Hanna decision had implicitly overruled its earlier
directive that a federal court sitting in diversity should apply
state law, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3," in
determining when an action is commenced for purposes of the
state statute of limitations. The Court held, as it had in Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,n that the state service
rule, which was "part and parcel of the [state] statute of
limitations," should apply over the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 3.72
Second, in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,7 the
defendant claimed on appeal that the jury verdict entered
against it was excessive, citing a New York tort reform statute
that instructed appellate courts, when reviewing an itemized
jury verdict, to "determine that an award is excessive or
inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be
reasonable compensation."7 4 Instead of applying Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59, governing motions for a new trial, which was
67 Redish & Amuluru, supra note 35, at 1332; see Carrington, supra note 35, at
286-87 ("Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has not applied [§ 2072(b)] to affect the
outcome of a single case in the fifty years of its operative history, the sentence might
be considered excess verbiage.").
6 Rowe, supra note 12, at 978-79 ("This issue of possible invalidity of a Federal
Rule for affecting substantive rights is of considerable academic interest . . .. It is,
though, a rarity in the real world and of limited practical significance.").
69 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
7o "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. CIV.
P. 3.
71 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
72 Walker, 446 U.S. at 751-52; see also Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action
Federalism: Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1131, 1148 (2011) ("The Court held that Rule 3 was too narrow to displace state
law on this issue. . . .").
7 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKINNEY 2011).
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the procedural mechanism by which the Defendants had
challenged the jury verdict, the Court measured the state law
against the judge-made federal appellate standard for
determining whether a jury verdict is excessive-that is, whether
the verdict "shocks the conscience."'" Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the majority, stressed that "[fiederal courts have interpreted
the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state
interests and regulatory policies."7 The Court applied the
modified outcome-determinative test from Hanna and held that
there would be significant outcome variations between the
federal and state courts if an appeals court were to apply the
"shocks the conscience" standard rather than that of the New
York statute." Therefore, the state law should apply so long as it
did not endanger any "essential [federal] characteristic.""
Third, in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp.," the Court considered the claim-preclusive effect of the
dismissal of a federal diversity action on grounds of the statute of
limitations. At issue was whether the case's outcome should be
controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which
provides that an involuntary dismissal other than the types
specifically identified in the Rule "operates as an adjudication
upon the merits."8 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous
Court, determined that the phrase "adjudication upon the
merits" in Rule 41(b) does not necessarily mean a judgment that
is entitled to claim-preclusive effect." One of the rationales
provided for this conclusion was that Rule 41(b), which governs
the internal procedures of the federal courts, could not possibly
control "the effect that must be accorded federal judgments by
other courts."" "Indeed, such a rule would arguably violate the
' Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429. The Court took this approach despite Justice
Ginsburg's acknowledgement "that a most usual ground for a Rule 59 motion is that
'the damages are excessive.'" Id. at 438 n.22 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 680 (6th ed. 2002)).
76 Id. at 428 n.7; see also Rowe, supra note 12, at 994 ("Gasperini speaks in
terms that suggest somewhat more deferential interpretations of federal law to
avoid federal-state conflicts.").
7 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 429-31.
78 Id. at 431-32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958)).
7 531 U.S. 497 (2001).
8o Id. at 501 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)).
1 Id. at 503.
82 Id.
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jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules
'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.' "83
Justice Scalia also concluded that this interpretation of Rule
41(b) would encourage forum shopping between state and federal
courts, which would violate Erie's federalism principles." Thus,
the Court incorporated reasoning approximating both the REA
("guided") and the RDA/modified Erie ("unguided") approaches to
reject the application of a federal rule.8 ' The Court ultimately
held that Semtek was "a classic case for adopting, as the federally
prescribed rule of decision, the [claim-preclusion] law that would
be applied by state courts in the [s]tate in which the federal
diversity court sits."8 6  By citing both Walker and Gasperini in
reaching this conclusion, the Court appeared to signal a
continuing emphasis on state law principles in its ErielHanna
jurisprudence.87
These three post-Hanna cases suggested the possibility of
applying state law in areas where federal law had traditionally
been applied pursuant to the REA." Although the Court had
stated in Walker that the Federal Rules "should be given their
plain meaning" and not "narrowly construed in order to avoid a
'direct collision' with state law,"" prior to 2010 it seemed willing,
" Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
84 Id. at 504.
85 The reasoning employed by the Court in Semtek is not without its critics. See,
e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 40-41 ("The opinion rummaged in
dictionaries and engaged in multiple wordplays to reach a result that is
demonstrably erroneous according to two very different interpretive techniques,
including one that Justice Scalia . .. usually favors: the exercise of logic in divining
'plain meaning.' ").
86 Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508. The Court observed that "any other rule would
produce the sort of 'forum-shopping . .. and . .. inequitable administration of the
laws' that Erie seeks to avoid." Id. at 508-09 (alterations in original) (quoting Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
87 See Steinman, supra note 6, at 303 (describing Semtek as "insisting that
federal courts defer to state law preclusion principles that favored plaintiffs").
88 Cooper, supra note 6, at 1257 ("Semtek's analysis thus appears to put Federal
Rule 56 in peril, at least in diversity cases in those jurisdictions that employ
different summary judgment standards, either as a matter of rule or as a matter of
decisional law."); Steinman, supra note 6, at 273 (considering how traditional Erie
principles may encourage the application of differing state standards in the areas of
summary judgment, class certification, and pleading).
8" Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980).
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in practice, to apply the Federal Rules with caution, or at least,
as Justice Ginsburg stated, "with sensitivity to important state
interests and regulatory policies."o
D. The Impact of Shady Grove on the Modern Erie Doctrine
The Supreme Court's 2009 to 2010 term featured the most
influential Erie case in years: Shady Grove." Although the
opinions in the case appear hopelessly splintered,9 2 they do
provide significant guidance as to the current state of the Erie
doctrine, and in particular the application of the REA's
substantive rights provision.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates treated Sonia Galvez,
the victim of a car accident and an Allstate policyholder.93 When
Allstate did not pay Shady Grove within thirty days and refused
to pay interest on the overdue payments pursuant to statute,94
Shady Grove filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all medical
providers to whom Allstate had failed to pay such penalties.9' A
New York state law provided that unless the state statute
imposing a penalty "specifically authorize[d] the recovery thereof
in a class action," class actions to recover the penalties imposed
by the statute were not permitted.96 The particular statute at
issue in Shady Grove did not explicitly authorize class action
suits, and without a class action, there could be no federal subject
9 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Hunmanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996).
" Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010). While Shady Grove was eagerly awaited by civil procedure professors, it is
dubious whether the Court thought it was one of the "featured" cases of its term.
While reading through the ten-minute summary of his plurality opinion, Justice
Scalia observed that "'[e]yes have glazed over already.'" James Vicini, Eyes Glaze
Over at the U.S. Supreme Court, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2010, 12:03 AM),
http://blogs.reuters.com/frontrow/2010/03/31/eyes-glaze-over-at-the-u-s-supreme-
court/. He also paused halfway through his statement to ask "courtroom spectators,
including tourists visiting on spring break, 'Are you with me?' " Id.
92 Justice Scalia garnered five votes for Parts I and II-A of his plurality opinion,
which held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 controlled. Justice Scalia was
joined by only three other Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Sotomayor) for Parts II-B and II-D of his opinion regarding the application of the
REA. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined in part II-C of Justice
Scalia's plurality, which responded directly to Justice Stevens's separate
concurrence. Justice Ginsburg was joined in dissent by Justices Kennedy, Breyer,
and Alito. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435.
" Id. at 1436.
9 N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2011).
" Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37.
96 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2011).
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matter jurisdiction over the case because Shady Grove's
individual claim was well below the amount in controversy
required for diversity jurisdiction. 7  Shady Grove sought
certification of its class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).9 ' The Second Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals, following the principles set forth in
Gasperini and Semtek, held that Rule 23 did "not control the
issue of which substantive causes of action may be brought as
class actions or which remedies may be sought by class action
plaintiffs," and thus applied an unguided Erie analysis."
Because a failure to apply the state law would encourage forum
shopping and initiate a migration of class action plaintiffs
towards the federal courts, the "twin aims" of Erie were
implicated, and the Second Circuit panel applied the state law. 00
There were five votes in Shady Grove for the position
reversing the Second Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals and disposing of the case: that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 is broad enough to encompass class actions filed to
recover penalties under the New York state law and that,
therefore, Rule 23 controls. In part II-A of his opinion, Justice
Scalia rejected the Second Circuit's rationale that Rule 23 only
determined whether a class could be certified, not whether a
particular type of claim is eligible to be brought as a class
action. 01 Instead, Justice Scalia wrote that "Rule 23 provides a
one-size-fits-all formula for deciding the class-action question."102
Because "Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any
federal civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule's
prerequisites are met," the five-justice majority declined to
a Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 n.3.
" Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 143
(2d Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
100 Id. at 145; see also Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in
Federal Class Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 285, 299 (2010) (characterizing the
Second Circuit's opinion as "an unusually clear example of a state substantive policy
relating to class actions" and the panel's decision to bar the class action as "a simple
matter").
1o. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438 ("[Tlhe line between eligibility and
certifiability is entirely artificial. Both are preconditions for maintaining a class
action.").
102 Id. at 1437.
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"contort" the Rule's text, "even to avert a collision with state law
that might render it invalid."'0 3 Under the modern Erie analysis,
then, Rule 23 must apply unless the REA precludes it.
Although five justices agreed that Rule 23 complied with the
REA, they split as to the rationale. Justice Scalia, joined by
three other justices in parts II-B and II-D of his opinion, relied
heavily upon Sibbach to construe the scope of § 2072(b)'s
proscription on any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that happens
to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."1 04 Most
procedural rules affect a litigant's substantive rights in some way
or another; nonetheless, a procedural rule will not implicate
§ 2072(b) if it "really regulat[es] procedure," meaning that "it
governs only 'the manner and the means' by which the litigants'
rights are 'enforced.' "105 Observing that the Court has "rejected
every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before
[it],"' 0 Justice Scalia would not look to the nature of the state
law being displaced to determine whether the Federal Rule
abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive right.' Rather, a
Federal Rule's compliance with the REA "is to be assessed by
consulting the Rule itself, and not its effects in individual
applications."' If the Federal Rule regulates procedure, "it is
authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect
to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created
rights.""0 ' Under Justice Scalia's proposed standard, it would be
difficult to fathom a situation in which the federal court would
not apply a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure once it is determined
that the Rule directly conflicts with a state statute. Justice
Scalia acknowledged in section II-D of the plurality opinion
that forum shopping may be an unfortunate byproduct of this
standard, but that, ultimately, "a Federal Rule governing
procedure is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the case
in a way that induces forum shopping.""0
103 Id. at 1442.
1 Id. at 1442, 1444 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
10. Id. at 1442 (quoting Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446
(1946)).
106 Id.
107 See id. at 1443-44; accord 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
10' Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444.
109 Id.
no Id. at 1447-48.
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In his separate opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledged that
"the bar for finding an [REA] problem is a high one,""' and he
concurred in the majority's result because he agreed that Rule 23
did not "abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right."112
Unlike Justice Scalia, however, Justice Stevens was willing to
entertain the possibility that an application of a Federal Rule
that effectively abridges, enlarges, or modifies a state-created
right or remedy could violate the REA.113 In Justice Stevens's
view, when a Federal Rule appears to violate § 2072(b), "federal
courts must consider whether the rule can reasonably be
interpreted to avoid that impermissible result.""4 In making this
determination, it is necessary for a court to look not only to the
nature of the Federal Rule in question, as Justice Scalia
instructed, but also to the effect on the state law or standard that
the Federal Rule would displace."' Moreover, it is not merely
enough to characterize the state law as "procedural" in order to
apply the federal law. If a state law defines substantive rights, a
Federal Rule that displaces it "would have altered the State's
substantive rights" and thus violated the REA, even if the state
law might be described as "procedural.""6 Thus, even if the
competing state law involves a procedural matter, the federal
court must determine whether it "actually is part of a State's
framework of substantive rights or remedies""' or is "so
intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to
define the scope of the state-created right.""' Justice Stevens
provided several examples of "ways in which seemingly
procedural rules may displace a [s]tate's formulation of its
Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
na Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451.
114 Id. at 1452 (citing Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,
503 (2001)).
1" Id. at 1453-54. In response to Justice Scalia's argument in part II-C of the
plurality opinion that requiring courts sitting in diversity to investigate the effect of
the Federal Rule on the state law would unduly tax the court, Justice Stevens wrote
that "[the question . . . is not what rule we think would be easiest on federal courts.
The question is what rule Congress established.. .. Courts cannot ignore text and
context in the service of simplicity." Id. at 1454.
116 Id. at 1453 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
n1 Id. at 1449.
us Id. at 1452.
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substantive law," such as through a statute of limitations, the
alteration of the burden of proof in a case, or the adoption of a
differing standard of appellate review."'
Justice Ginsburg's dissent is reminiscent of her majority
opinion from fourteen years earlier in Gasperini. She stressed
that she "would continue to interpret Federal Rules with
awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory
policies."12 0 Moreover, she criticized the majority for "veer[ing]
away from that approach ... in favor of a mechanical reading of
Federal Rules, insensitive to state interests and productive of
discord.""' Justice Ginsburg would have held, as she did in
Gasperini, that the Federal Rule was not controlling, then
applied an unguided Erie analysis to reach the conclusion that
the New York statute should have barred the class action suit.12 2
In attempting to extract the precedential value of Shady
Grove, it is clear that a majority of the Court subscribed to
Justice Scalia's expansive view of when a Federal Rule or
procedural statute controls and rejected the dissent's more
narrow interpretation of the Federal Rules, in general, and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, in particular. It has yet to be
determined whether Shady Grove portends an enduring shift in
the Court's view as to the threshold Erie/Hanna question, 12 3 or
whether the impact of its analysis could be limited to the
class action realm. The plurality's reliance on Sibbach's "really
regulates procedure" standard to determine whether a Federal
Rule exceeds the boundaries of the REA by abridging, modifying,
or enlarging a substantive state right potentially has broad
implications, but this position failed to garner the support of a
majority of justices.124  It is well established that "[w]hen a
"' Id. at 1453 n.9; see discussion infra Part III.
120 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 1463-64.
122 See id. at 1468-70. For the time being, at least, critics of Justice Ginsburg's
Gasperini opinion have been redeemed. See generally Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George
Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What's Wrong with the Recent
Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 710-18 (2006).
123 The notion that any shift in the Court's Erie/Hanna jurisprudence might be
"enduring" should be met with skepticism. "[W]ith nearly every case, the Court
seems to correct course or careen in a different direction." Tidmarsh, supra note 66,
at 878.
124 For an extended and illuminating discussion of the debate between Justices
Scalia and Stevens regarding the analysis to be undertaken in determining whether
a federal rule exceeds the boundaries of the REA, see generally Ides, supra note 39.
1030 [Vol. 85:1011
2011] SHADY GROVE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds.' "125 Applying this standard, Justice
Stevens's concurring opinion is the holding of the Court on the
§ 2072 analysis.126  Thus, by thrusting the debate over when a
Federal Rule might be held invalid out of the theoretical realm
and into the Court's jurisprudence, the four members of the
plurality may have unwittingly revitalized the federalism
principles espoused by Justice Stevens and the dissenters. As
discussed in Part III below, Justice Stevens's position on the
validity of a Federal Rule under the REA, when combined with
principles from the still-valid decisions in Gasperini and Semtek,
has significant implications for the application of state
substantive law by federal courts sitting in diversity, including
principles, such as the summary judgment standard, that
traditionally have been characterized as "procedural."
II. DIVERGENT FEDERAL AND STATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STANDARDS
Most states have adopted procedural rules that are based, in
whole or in part, upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
however, several of these states have declined to follow the
Supreme Court's guidance in Celotex regarding the standard to
be applied in adjudicating a motion for summary judgment.12 7
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and most state standards
provide that a court may grant summary judgment to the moving
party if there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Where state
standards have differed from the federal approach, however, is in
Professor Ides ultimately concludes that Justice Stevens's approach is the preferable
interpretation because it is more faithful to the text of § 2072(b). Id.
125 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
126 See discussion and cases cited infra Part III.
127 For sources acknowledging the differences between Celotex and a number of
individual states and discussing such differences in varying levels of detail, see
Cooper, supra note 6, at 1248-49; Judy M. Cornett, Trick or Treat? Summary
Judgment in Tennessee after Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 77 TENN. L. REV. 305,
344-45 & nn.266-75 (2010); Lind, supra note 17, at 769-70 & nn.293-316;
Steinman, supra note 6, at 278-79 & nn.220-21.
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the amount of evidence that the moving party must present to
shift the burden of proof to the non-moving party and, ultimately,
prevail on the motion.
A. The Federal Summary Judgment Standard
The changes in the federal summary judgment standard
wrought by the Celotex trilogy of cases have been the subject of
voluminous commentary since their release in 1988, such that an
extended discussion here would be redundant.128  Because this
Article focuses on the effect of the differences between the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 in Celotex and the standards in several states,12 9
however, a brief review of the Celotex rule is needed. In Celotex,
a widow asserted that her husband's death was caused
by exposure to asbestos manufactured or distributed by
the corporate defendants.13 0  Celotex asserted that summary
judgment was proper because the plaintiff "had failed to
identify ... any witnesses who could testify about the decedent's
exposure to petitioner's asbestos products."'31 In response to the
summary judgment motion, Catrett produced three documents
which tended to establish the decedent's exposure to asbestos.13 2
128 See generally Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Summary
Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1329 (2005); Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex-
Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81 (2006); Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007).
129 Anderson, which addressed the burden of proof on summary judgment when
the nature of the plaintiffs claims are such that there would be a heightened
standard of proof at trial, and Matsushita, which stands for the proposition that the
party bearing the burden of persuasion at trial must present evidence at the
summary judgment phase that at least plausibly establishes its case, are both
significant cases in their own right. See Redish, supra note 128, at 1334. Moreover,
some state courts have specifically declined to follow Anderson or Matsushita,
creating additional variations between the state and federal summary judgment
standards. See Lind, supra note 17, at 770 & nn.305-16. This Article, however,
focuses on Celotex, which, "[o]f the three . . . most clearly altered well-established
summary judgment practice, and .. . far more than the others, decisively opened the
eyes of the federal courts to the propriety of summary judgment in certain
cases . . . ." Redish, supra note 128, at 1348.
130 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986).
"a Id. at 320.
132 Id.
[Vol. 85:10111032
20111 SHADY GROVE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Celotex plurality opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist,
construed the plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c) 133 as mandating "the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial."1"4 This meant that a
moving party who did not bear the burden of persuasion at trial
was not required to "support its motion with affidavits or other
similar materials negating the opponent's claim."135 Instead, "the
burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-
that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."136
Because only three other justices joined in Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, Celotex did not set a definite precedent
regarding the evidence that a moving party who does not bear
the burden of proof at trial is required to present in support of
its summary judgment motion. Under the Marks rule,'3 7 the
holding of the Court ostensibly should have been represented by
the concurring opinion of Justice White, who clarified that "[i]t is
not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting
the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the
plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case.""' Adding to the
confusion was Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, which set
forth its own view of the burden of proof on summary judgment
under the guise of providing "clarity" to the majority opinion.139
1I At the time of Celotex, the language of Rule 56(c) stated, in relevant part:
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 323 n.4. Substantially
similar language can still be found in the current Rule 56(a). FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
134 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
13 Id. at 323 (emphasis omitted).
136 Id. at 325.
137 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977).
138 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 329-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan indicated his view of
how the moving party might satisfy its burden of production under Rule 56 where
the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the non-moving party. "First, the
moving party may submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim. Second, the moving party may demonstrate to the
Court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim." Id. at 331.
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Most lower federal courts, however, have interpreted Celotex to
mean that a moving party who does not have the burden of proof
at trial lacks any burden of production at the summary judgment
phase.1 40 Thus, the moving party can "meet the initial burden of
showing 'the absence of a genuine issue of material fact' as to an
essential element of the non-movant's case . . . by pointing out to
the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity
for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of
his or her case."'4 1 This interpretation reduces summary
judgment to the "put up or shut up" moment in litigation,14 2
during which the burden of proof falls entirely on the non-moving
party who will bear the burden at trial.
B. State Summary Judgment Standards
In contrast to the interpretation that most federal courts
have given Celotex, several state courts have imposed a higher
burden of production on the party moving for summary
judgment, even where that party will not bear the burden of
proof at trial. One state in which this issue has received
significant attention in recent years among the bench and bar is
Tennessee. The Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, modeled
upon the Federal Rules, were adopted in 1971.1 Beyond
differences in the internal numbering of the rules, the Tennessee
summary judgment rule is virtually identical to its federal
140 See A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
791 (3d ed. 2011); Redish, supra note 128, at 1345 ("Since Celotex, the majority of
lower federal courts have wisely read that decision to impose virtually no burden at
all on the movant where she would have no burden of proof at trial."). But see
Steinman, supra note 128, at 109-13 (describing this "paper trial" interpretation of
Celotex as a "myth," primarily because this interpretation "places Celotex in
fundamental conflict" with Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)).
141 Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).
141 Id. at 1478 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Steen v. Myers, 486
F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e have consistently held that summary
judgment is 'not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it is the put up or shut up moment
in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a
trier of fact to accept its version of the events.' ") (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle
Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005)); Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v.
Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006) ("In this respect, summary judgment is
essentially 'put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party
must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions
made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.") (citing Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985)).
' See Cornett, supra note 127, at 310.
[Vol. 85:10111034
2011] SHADY GROVE AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
counterpart. 144 Prior to the adoption of the Rules, summary
judgment was not available in civil actions in Tennessee; because
of the significance of this change, the Advisory Committee
considered Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 as "one of the
most important and desirable additions to Tennessee procedure
contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure" and "a substantial step
forward to the end that litigation may be accelerated,
insubstantial issues removed, and trial confined only to genuine
issues."145
The Tennessee Supreme Court's first major interpretation of
the summary judgment standard under Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 was in Byrd v. Hall,14 6 a 1993 case that "quickly
became Tennessee's summary judgment bible." 47 In Byrd, the
court affirmed the vitality of summary judgment in Tennessee,
assuring litigants that summary judgment "is not a disfavored
procedural shortcut but rather an important vehicle for
concluding cases that can and should be resolved on legal issues
alone."14 8 The court summarized the federal standard set forth in
Celotex, and while it purported to "embrace" that standard, 14 9 it
also stated that Justice White's concurring opinion, which
observed that a movant cannot shift the burden of proof through
a conclusory motion unsupported by evidence, "correctly place[d]
a finer point on the Court's holding" in Celotex. 50  To this end,
144 Prior to the changes in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 that became
effective December 1, 2010, the primary textual distinction between the federal and
state rules was Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03, which requires all motions
for summary judgment to "be accompanied by a separate concise statement of the
material facts [set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph] . . . to which the moving
party contends there is no genuine issue for trial." TENN. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Adopted in
1997, this section "tracks the language of a local federal rule of the Middle District of
Tennessee." Nancy Fraas MacLean, Practice Series, TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.03 (4th ed.
2010-11).
14 MacLean, Practice Series, TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.03; see also Byrd v. Hall, 847
S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993).
146 847 S.W.2d 208.
1 Andrde Sophia Blumstein, Bye, Bye Byrd? Summary Judgment after Hannan
and Martin: Which Way To Go?, TENN. B.J., Feb. 2009, at 23, 23.
14 Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210.
14 Id. at 214.
160 Judy M. Cornett, The Legacy of Byrd v. Hall: Gossiping About Summary
Judgment in Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REv. 175, 184 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
Professor Cornett made the following observation about the Byrd court's tacit
approval of Justice White's concurring opinion in Celotex:
Despite quoting the Sixth Circuit, the Tennessee Supreme Court
obviously read Celotex differently, indicated most clearly by the adverb
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the court made clear that "[a] conclusory assertion that the
nonmoving party has no evidence is clearly insufficient."'5 '
Instead, a moving party can only demonstrate to the court that
there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial either by
"affirmatively negatling] an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim" or by "conclusively establish[ing] an affirmative
defense that defeats the nonmoving party's claim."152 Notably,
the court cited to Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Celotex
in developing this test.' 3 Although the state supreme court
reaffirmed Byrd's burden-shifting standard in several
subsequent cases,'54 the inconsistent statements in Byrd
regarding the federal and Tennessee rules for summary
judgment had "led to some confusion among Tennessee courts as
to the proof required for the moving party to meet its burden of
production."'
This confusion was addressed in 2008 in Hannan v. Alltel
Publishing Co., which clarified that the Tennessee Supreme
Court "did not adopt a 'put up or shut up' approach to burden-
shifting in Byrd or in subsequent cases.""' Instead, the court
adopted a standard that was similar to, but actually posed a
heavier burden than, the standard espoused in Justice Brennan's
dissent in Celotex.6' Then-Chief Justice Janice Holder left no
doubt about the operative standard for summary judgment in
Tennessee: "[A] moving party who seeks to shift the burden of
production to the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof
at trial must either: (1) affirmatively negate an essential element
of the nonmoving party's claim; or (2) show that the nonmoving
correctly. In one sense, the adverb is inappropriate because the Tennessee
Supreme Court is not the authority on what constitutes a correct reading of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In another sense, however, the court
was signaling its reluctance to adopt an interpretation of a "virtually
identical" Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 that would allow a movant
to do nothing more than conclusorily assert that the nonmovant cannot
prove its case. The adverb "correctly" is the first telltale sign that
Tennessee and federal summary judgment practice are about to diverge.
Id. at 186.
"s' Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215.
152 Id. at 215 n.5.
" Id. at 215 n.6.
154 See, e.g., Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tenn. 2004); McCarley
v. W. Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 587-88 (Tenn. 1998).
'6 Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008).
1 Id. at 6.
1s7 See id. at 6-7.
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party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial."1 58
Applying this standard to the facts of Hannan, the court held
that summary judgment was inappropriate. 1 5 9
Two fact patterns illustrate the practical effects of the
difference between the Byrd/Hannan standard in Tennessee and
other similar state summary judgment standards and the Celotex
standard in federal court. First, Hannan itself presented a
situation in which the complaint likely would not survive a
summary judgment motion brought in federal court in
Tennessee, particularly because the state sits within the Sixth
Circuit of the Untied States Court of Appeals, which has
explicitly adopted the "put up or shut up" interpretation of
Celotex.160 The plaintiffs, who operated a bed and breakfast in a
rural area of Tennessee, alleged that their business was
irrevocably harmed because the defendants mistakenly omitted
their paid advertisement from the telephone book.16 ' The ad
damnum clause of their complaint sought damages in the
amount of $225,000.162 The defendants moved for summary
judgment, pointing to, inter alia, the plaintiffs' deposition
testimony, in which they were unable to quantify any measure of
damages. 163  As Professor Cornett has observed, this evidence
"appeared to present a classic case in which the party having the
ultimate burden of proof lacked evidence at the discovery phase
of an essential element of its case, damages."164 Under the "put
up or shut up" standard followed by federal courts in the Sixth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, summary
judgment almost certainly would have been granted. The
Tennessee Supreme Court held, however, that even though the
1s Id. at 8-9. Some of the confusion about the standard arose from the Byrd
court's use of the term "affirmative defense" in a way that conflicted with its
commonly understood definition. Id. at 6. The court set this misstatement straight in
Hannan, clarifying that to "establish an affirmative defense," as used in Byrd,
actually means to "show [] that the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential
element of the claim at trial." Id. at 7.
15' Id. at 10-11.
160 See, e.g., Cox v. Ky. Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995); Street
v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989).
161 See Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 2-3.
162 Id. at 3.
13 See id. at 3-4. For example, when asked in her deposition how she might
document or quantify in dollars the amount of her loss as a result of the omission in
the telephone book, Mrs. Hannan responded " I 'have absolutely no way of doing
that. And neither does anyone else.' "Id. at 4.
164 Cornett, supra note 127, at 324.
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plaintiffs' testimony failed to quantify the amount of damages,
they consistently alleged the existence of damages." Thus, the
deposition testimony introduced by the defendants neither
negated an essential element of the plaintiffs' claim nor showed
that they could not prove the existence of damages at trial.66
Justice William Koch, in his dissent, described a second
example of a fact pattern that would have a disparate outcome
under the federal and Tennessee standards. In his efforts to
show that the majority's decision would have "significant and far-
reaching" effects and "provide another safe harbor for those who
are unprepared," Justice Koch cited the example of the plaintiff
in a medical malpractice case, who is required by statute in
Tennessee to proffer qualified expert testimony regarding the
standard of care and the breach of that standard. 161
Traditionally, Tennessee defendants could obtain summary
judgment in their favor by showing that the plaintiffs experts
were unqualified to testify because, for example, they failed to
meet the statutory requirements of familiarity with both the
medical specialty and the locality in which the alleged breach of
the standard of care occurred.'6 8 Certainly such a motion would
be successful in a federal court applying the substantive law
of Tennessee. Justice Koch observed, however, that under the
majority's standard, "[s]uccessfully challenging a particular
expert's qualifications does not demonstrate that the plaintiff
cannot prove an essential element of its case," but rather simply
shows "that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of
its case with that expert."' Subject to a court's enforcement of
its expert discovery deadlines, the case could continue
indefinitely while the plaintiff tries to find an expert who is
qualified. 70
Tennessee is the most recent and active example of a state
that has affirmatively rejected the Celotex standard in favor of
one that places a greater burden on the moving party at the
16. Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 10.
166 Id. at 11.
167 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 19-20 (Koch, J., dissenting); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-26-115(b) (West 2011).
168 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 19 n.28, 20 (Koch, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 20.
170 See id. Justice Koch observed that this "remains an open question." Id.
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summary judgment phrase."' Several other states, however,
have also done so. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court
explicitly eschewed the federal standard and reaffirmed that
summary judgment is only appropriate under Kentucky Civil
Rule 56.03 "where the movant shows that the adverse party
cannot prevail under any circumstances."'72 Like Tennessee Rule
of Civil Procedure 56, Kentucky Civil Rule 56.03 corresponds to
the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.173 Given the
choice to conform to the federal standard, however, the Kentucky
Supreme Court declined and chose to retain the standard that it
had adopted several years earlier.174 Asserting the importance of
allowing litigants to retain the right to try all valid issues, the
court observed that, unlike the federal courts, it "perceive [d] no
oppressive or unmanageable case backlog or problems with
unmeritorious or frivolous litigation in the state's courts that
17 In May 2011, the Tennessee General Assembly passed legislation with
purpose of "overrul[ing] the summary judgment standard for parties who do not bear
the burden of proof at trial set forth in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., its progeny,
and the cases relied on in Hannan." 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498 (codified at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 (West 2011)). The standard adopted in the bill is as follows:
In motions for summary judgment in any civil action in Tennessee, the
moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial shall prevail on
its motion for summary judgment if it:
(1) Submits affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim; or
(2) Demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's
claim.
Id. § 1. This standard is identical to that espoused in the dissenting opinions written
by Justice Brennan in Celotex and, subsequently, Justice Koch in Hannan. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 15-17
(Koch, J., dissenting). Because the legislation applies only to actions filed after July
1, 2011, the impact of the Public Law No. 498 may not be determined for some time.
2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498 at § 3. Despite the bill's express purpose, it is not clear
that it overrules Hannan. Hannan determined how a party moving for summary
judgment shifts the burden to the non-moving party, while the bill sets forth when
the moving party "shall prevail on its motion for summary judgment." Id. § 1.
Moreover, if the bill does overrule Hannan, it is open to a constitutional challenge,
particularly on separation of powers grounds. See State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473,
483 (Tenn. 2001) ("[T]he legislature can have no constitutional authority to enact
rules, either of evidence or otherwise, that strike at the very heart of a court's
exercise of judicial power . . . . Among these inherent judicial powers are the powers
to hear facts, to decide the issues of fact made by the pleadings, and to decide the
questions of law involved." (citations omitted)).
172 Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 479-82 (Ky.
1991) (citing Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985)).
171 Id. at 480.
174 Id. at 482.
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would require us to adopt a new approach such as the new
federal standards.""7 The Kentucky standard, which is similar
to the second prong of the Tennessee burden-shifting analysis as
set forth in Hannan, has three significant differences from the
Celotex standard: (1) a movant in Kentucky "must convince the
court, by the evidence of record, of the nonexistence of an issue of
material fact," rather than simply pointing to a lack of evidence
offered by the non-moving party; (2) the state test for summary
judgment is different from the test for a directed verdict,
reflecting a policy choice in Kentucky "that a ruling on a
summary judgment is a more delicate matter and that its inquiry
requires a greater judicial determination and discretion since it
takes the case away from the trier of fact before the evidence is
actually heard"; and (3) summary judgment will not be granted
in Kentucky unless the moving party's "right to judgment is
shown with such clarity that there is no room left for
controversy. "176
Like its sister courts in Tennessee and Kentucky, the
Indiana Supreme Court has "expressly disavowed the federal
standard set forth in Celotex.""7 Specifically, Indiana's highest
court has held that the party moving for summary judgment has
the burden of negating the nonmoving party's claim-that is,
showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact-with
evidence.1 7 1 "Merely alleging that the plaintiff has failed to
produce evidence on each element" is not enough to obtain
summary judgment.17 9  As Professor Cooper observes, the
difference between the Indiana standard and the federal
standard "may be somewhat difficult to articulate, but it is real:
"[It is generally much harder to establish a negative, as the
171 Id. at 482-83.
176 Id. at 481-82. Professor Cornett has considered the relationship between
summary judgment and the directed verdict in Tennessee after Hannan and
concluded that the Tennessee Supreme Court has made a policy choice similar to
that made in Kentucky. See Cornett, supra note 127, at 344 ("Tennessee's summary
judgment standard says, in effect: If you want out of this lawsuit on the merits short
of a trial, you must be willing to bear some burden. If you do not wish to produce
evidence, you can wait for the trial and make a motion for a directed verdict at the
end of the plaintiffs case in chief. But we will not substitute one for the other.").
177 Dennis v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(citing Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 118
(Ind. 1994)).
.78 Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123.
17 Id.
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Indiana interpretation of its Rule 56 requires, than it is to
suggest a negative and require the opposing party to prove a
positive, as Celotex requires."1 s In addition to these three
examples, several other states appear to have rejected the
Celotex standard in favor of one that raises the burden on the
party moving for summary judgment. These states include
California,18' Florida,'82 Oklahoma,183 Oregon, 184 Texas,185 and
Utah.'88
Clearly, there exist differences between the federal and state
standards for summary judgments in several states, and these
differences are more than simply theoretical. Moreover, the
number of states asserting their independence from the Celotex
standard appears to be growing, rather than dissipating, over
time. This dichotomy between two court systems leads inevitably
to the vertical choice-of-law question addressed in Part I above:
When a federal judge in one of the several states that assign a
higher burden of proof to summary judgment movants is faced
180 Cooper, supra note 6, at 1257.
... Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Ct. App. 2001)
(citing the Celotex standard and observing that "a like rule does not appear ever to
have prevailed under the California summary judgment statute.").
182 5G's Car Sales, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 581 So. 2d 212, 212
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (declining to follow Celotex and continuing to follow
standard set forth in Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)). See generally
Leonard D. Pertnoy, Summary Judgment in Florida: The Road Less Traveled, 20 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 69 (2007) (arguing that Florida should revisit its restrictive
summary judgment standard, which has not been comprehensively reexamined
since Holl).
" Kating ex rel Gist v. City of Pryor ex rel. Mun. Util. Bd., 977 P.2d 1142, 1144
(Okla. Civ. App. 1998) ("[T]he federal summary judgment standards established in
Celotex . .. and other related federal cases are not specifically applicable in
Oklahoma appellate review of summary judgments.").
1" Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 P.2d 608, 616 (Or. 1997) (declining to
interpret Oregon's summary judgment statute, which was patterned on Federal Rule
56, to incorporate the Celotex trilogy when Oregon adopted its rule prior to those
cases).
18' Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989) (observing that
"[slummary judgments in federal courts are based on different assumptions, with
different purposes, than summary judgements in Texas," and holding that "[nothing
in [Celotex] compels us to abandon our established summary judgment procedure").
186 Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah 2008) ("Utah law does not allow a
summary judgment movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving
party's case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence
establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.").
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with a summary judgment motion, and the basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction is diversity, should the court apply the
federal standard or the state standard?
III. THE VERTICAL CHOICE OF LAW IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CASES AFTER SHADY GROVE
Is it realistic to expect that federal courts sitting in diversity
will apply state summary judgment standards when they differ
from the Celotex standard? Shady Grove provides substantial
insight. Federal courts have traditionally applied the federal
summary judgment standard, regardless of the basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction.1 8 1 Prior to Shady Grove, however,
some commentators were bullish that Gasperini (which urged
courts to focus on state regulatory interests when undertaking an
Erie analysis) and Semtek (which declined to apply a federal rule
based, in part, on the conclusion that doing so would abridge,
enlarge, or modify a substantive state right) at least cracked
open the door for application of divergent state summary
judgment standards under the Erie doctrine.18 8 At first glance, it
might appear that the Shady Grove plurality, with its
reaffirmation of Sibbach's "really regulates procedure" standard,
has slammed that door shut.8 ' The Court's recent denial of a
petition for writ of certiorari by a party arguing for the
application of Tennessee's summary judgment standard in a
187 See, e.g., Shropshire v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 550 F.3d 570, 574 (6th Cir.
2008) (stating that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 applies "even where the
federal summary judgment requirements displace state law that would require a
jury to make a particular determination").
18 See Cooper, supra note 6, at 1255 ("[Tlhe Semtek Court's analysis has
implications that potentially reach far beyond the narrow confines of claim
preclusion, implications that ultimately may affect the continued viability of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a uniform set of procedural rules for lawsuits
brought in federal courts."); Steinman, supra note 6, at 273-304 (considering how
traditional Erie principles may encourage the application of differing state
standards in the areas of summary judgment, class certification, and pleading).
189 Clermont, supra note 5, ("[Tlhe summary judgment hypothetical seems an
easy case after Shady Grove, because the Court sapped Gasperini and Semtek's
vitality as to Rule construction."); Cooper, supra note 6, at 1263 ("In the days
following the Shady Grove decision, Federal Rule 56 appears to be on firmer ground
than it was when Semtek represented the Court's last major statement on how to
assess the validity of a Federal Rule."); see also Ides, supra note 39, at 1041
(awaiting cautiously a future opinion of the Court that takes a clear majority
position on the issue).
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federal court does little to alter that initial impression.190 Justice
Stevens's concurring opinion, however, provides significant, and
perhaps surprising, support to the position that a faithful
application of Erie's principles mandates the use of state
summary judgment standards by federal courts sitting in
diversity. An argument may be made for a federal court to apply
the state's summary judgment standard using either a guided
Erie approach under the REA or an unguided Erie approach
under the RDA. The former is likely to find a more receptive
audience in the lower federal courts.
A. The Rules Enabling Act Approach
Both arguments for the application of state summary
judgment standards in federal court begin, as Shady Grove did,
with the threshold "characterization question""' of whether a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 56, is broad
enough to cover the issue in dispute. If it is, then under Hanna
the court must apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 so long
as it meets the requirements of the REA. Although a narrow
construction of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 might have
been justified after Gasperini and Semtek, the five votes to apply
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in Shady Grove make this
determination highly unlikely.9 2 Presuming that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 is in "direct collision" with the summary
judgment standards of the state in which the federal court sits,
the federal court must apply it unless it runs afoul of the
Constitution or 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Of course, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 is "arguably procedural," but the analysis of
whether its application abridges, enlarges, or modifies a
substantive state right is much more intriguing. Under Justice
190 See Medison Am., Inc. v. Preferred Med. Sys., L.L.C., 357 F. App'x. 656, 661-
62 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 101 (2010).
191 See Tidmarsh, supra note 66.
192 Professor Cooper recently described the odds against the Court opting for an
unguided Erie analysis in the area of summary judgment:
Although the question of whether Rule 23 directly conflicts with section
902(b) is certainly debatable .. . it would be virtually impossible to argue
that Federal Rule 56, setting forth the procedures for filing a motion for
summary judgment and setting forth the circumstances in which such a
motion may be granted, does not control a motion filed in federal court and
designated as a motion for summary judgment, even in a diversity case.
Cooper, supra note 6, at 1259.
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Scalia's approach, which would look only to whether Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 "really regulates procedure," the answer
would be simple: the federal rule applies. Justice Stevens's
concurring view on the § 2072(b) analysis, however, is controlling
under the "narrowest grounds" rule of Marks, despite technically
having received only one vote.' 9' Thus, until the Supreme Court
weighs in on the issue again, the lower federal courts should look
at the competing state law and determine whether it "actually is
part of a [sitate's framework of substantive rights or remedies,"'
or "so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions
to define the scope of the state-created right."' 5
A review of the lower court decisions citing to Shady Grove
suggests that Justice Stevens's concurring opinion has given
teeth to the notion that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure can
be invalidated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Indeed, several
federal courts faced with the choice between a federal rule and
competing state law in the wake of Shady Grove have cited
Justice Stevens's concurrence and held that, although the federal
rule controls, it should be invalidated and the state law applied
because the federal law abridges, enlarges, or modifies a
substantive state right. 9 6 Several of these decisions involve the
application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
In Bearden v. Honeywell International, Inc., the plaintiffs
had moved into a newly constructed home with two electronic
air cleaners installed.1 97  Subsequently, one of the plaintiffs
developed a respiratory infection that lasted over several
months. 98 The plaintiffs filed a class action suit in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
alleging that the illness was caused by ozone produced by the air
193 Although Justice Ginsburg's dissent did not explicitly join with Justice
Stevens's concurrence on this point, she did observe that "a majority of th[e]
Court . .. agrees that Federal Rules should be read with moderation in diversity
suits to accommodate important state concerns." Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1464 n.2 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. at 1452.
11 In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F. Supp. 2d 642, 660 (E.D. Mich.
2011) (citing cases) ("Courts interpreting the Shady Grove decision, and searching
for guidance on this issue, have concluded that Justice Stevens' concurrence is the
controlling opinion by which interpreting courts are bound.").
197 Bearden v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 2010).
198 Id.
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cleaners and claiming various torts, including violations of
the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA").99 Tennessee
decisional law interpreting the TCPA is clear that class actions
are not permitted for claimed violations of the TCPA claim.2 00
The plaintiffs argued that Shady Grove compelled the district
court to allow the class action to proceed.20' The district court
seemed to assume, likely correctly, that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 controlled over the state supreme court's
interpretation of the TCPA. Citing the Marks "narrowest
grounds" rule, however, the court concluded that "Justice
Stevens's concurrence is the controlling opinion" in Shady Grove
with regard to whether the federal rule abridges, enlarges, or
modifies a substantive right provided by the state.20 2 Applying
this approach, the court held that "the class-action limitation
contained in the TCPA is so intertwined with that statute's
rights and remedies that it functions to define the scope of the
substantive rights."203  Because the restriction on class actions
under the TCPA "is a part of Tennessee's framework of
substantive rights and remedies, Rule 23 [did] not apply," and
the plaintiffs were prohibited from maintaining a class action
suit for their TCPA claim, just as they would have been had they
filed their suit in Tennessee state court.204
In two other cases with similar claims, courts in the
Northern District of Ohio reached the same conclusion.2 0 5 The
Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act ("OCSPA") includes a
provision that a class action suit is permissible to recover
damages for a violation of the OCSPA if "the violation was an act
or practice declared to be deceptive or unconscionable." 206  The
19 Id. at *2. The TCPA is codified in TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104-130 (West
2011).
200 See Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 308-11
(Tenn. 2008) (holding that the TCPA's directive in TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-
109(a)(1) that states that anyone aggrieved under the statute "may bring an action
individually to recover actual damages" is unambiguous and does not authorize
plaintiffs to bring class-action TCPA claims).
201 Bearden, 2010 WL 3239285, at *9.
202 Id. at *10.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733 (N.D. Ohio 2010); In re
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-WP-65000, 2010
WL 2756947 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010).
206 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (West 2011); accord In re Whirlpool
Corp., 2010 WL 2756947, at *1 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B)).
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plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant's conduct had been
declared deceptive or unconscionable, yet argued that they
should be able to maintain a class action suit for the alleged
OCSPA violations, notwithstanding the state law based upon the
Court's application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in
Shady Grove.2 07 The district court, rejecting this argument,
reasoned that the class action restriction in the Ohio statute is
substantive in nature because it "is intimately interwoven with
the substantive remedies available under the OCSPA."2 08
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, therefore, was declared "ultra
vires under the approach of Justice Stevens (the crucial fifth vote
in Shady Grove) because it 'would abridge, enlarge, or modify
[Ohio's] rights or remedies, and thereby violate the [Rules]
Enabling Act.' "209 The McKinney court followed the rationale of
the opinions in Bearden and Whirlpool to reach the same
conclusion.210
Most recently, a district court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania considered whether class plaintiffs should be given
leave to amend their complaint to add Illinois and New York
state law antitrust claims after the Supreme Court's Shady
Grove opinion was released. 2 " The plaintiffs argued that the
restrictions on bringing class actions under Illinois and New
York state laws were no longer valid after Shady Grove, which
had held that similar restrictions in New York did not apply in
federal court because they conflicted with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.212 Like the federal courts in Tennessee and Ohio
before it, the court held that Justice Stevens's concurrence was
207 In re Whirlpool Corp., 2010 VVL 2756947, at *1.
208 Id. at *2.
20 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1457 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
210 McKinney, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 747-49. A recent article looked to these three
decisions and suggested both that "[d]efendants should invoke the narrowest
grounds rule as a basis for applying the approach of Justice Stevens" and, more
specifically, that "[flor federal class action claims under state consumer protection
statutes that restrict class actions-for example, by limiting the conduct on which
plaintiffs may base such a claim-defendants should argue . . . that those
restrictions are part of the state's framework of substantive rights and remedies and
reflect the state's policy on how to remedy wrongful conduct affecting a consumer
class." Jack E. Pace III & Rachel J. Feldman, From Shady to Dark: One Year Later,
Shady Grove's Meaning Remains Unclear, 25 ANTITRUST 75, 81 (2011).
211 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 672 (E.D. Pa.
2010).
212 Id.
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controlling with regard to whether "the validity of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure turns, in part, on the rights afforded by the
state rule that the Federal Rule displaces."21 3 Applying this test,
the court held that the Illinois restrictions on class action suits
by indirect purchasers were
intertwined with Illinois substantive rights and remedies
because (1) the restrictions apply only to the [Illinois Antitrust
Act], (2) they are incorporated in the same statutory provision
as the underlying right, not a separate procedural rule, and
(3) [they] appear to reflect a policy judgment about managing
the danger of duplicative recoveries. 214
Because the "application of Rule 23" in the face of these state
restrictions "would 'abridge, enlarge, or modify' Illinois'
substantive rights," the state restrictions applied in federal court,
and the plaintiffs could not amend their complaint to add the
Illinois antitrust claims.21 5
Each of these four cases, like Shady Grove, involved class
actions; perhaps they are indicative of pushback from district
court judges who are reaffirming the ability of states to place
limitations on class actions filed within their borders.2 16 For
lower court judges who are convinced that the Shady Grove
plurality overreached, Justice Stevens's concurrence provides a
lifeline justifying the use of § 2072(b) to enforce federalism
interests and maintain some control over causes of action arising
from their own state statutes.2 1 7 There is no logical reason,
213 Id. at 675.
21 Id. at 677. The court allowed the Plaintiffs to add the New York state law
claims, concluding that they were "distinguishable from the [Illinois Antitrust Act's]
restrictions not merely because New York's limitation is in a separate procedural
provision, but also because [the New York statute] does not define state-created
rights because it applies to all sources of law." Id. at 680.
216 Id. at 677.
216 Recently, a district court in the Southern District of New York deferred to
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion as the controlling precedent from Shady Grove
on the issue of whether a federal rule "'exceeds statutory authorization or
Congress's rulemaking power.'" In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig., No. 06 MD
1780(LAP), 2011 WL 2848195, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011) (quoting Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (plurality
opinion)). The court rejected the Plaintiff class's attempt to amend its complaint in
the wake of Shady Grove to add Illinois antitrust claims, holding that the Illinois
legislature's decision to preclude class action suits to remedy violations of the state
antitrust statute was a substantive policy judgment. Id. at *18.
217 As Justice Ginsburg wryly observed, Congress passed the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 "envision[ing] fewer-not more-class actions overall," and it
will be highly ironic if CAFA makes "federal courts a mecca for suits of the kind
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however, to limit Justice Stevens's § 2072(b) analysis to class
action suits. Indeed, the lower courts' willingness to use Justice
Stevens's rationale when considering the application of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the same federal rule that a majority
of the Court, including Justice Stevens, interpreted so broadly in
Shady Grove, should suggest that courts should not hesitate to
extend the rationale to other federal rules when they conflict
with state laws, rules, and standards that are bound up with
substantive rights.
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals did exactly that in Garman ex rel. Garman v. Campbell
County School District No. 1.218 In Garman, the mother of a
junior high school student in Wyoming who allegedly was injured
during her physical education class filed suit against the school
district in federal court alleging both federal and state law
claims.21 9 A state statute, the Wyoming Governmental Claims
Act ("WGCA"),220 codified a provision in the state constitution2 2 1
requiring anyone filing suit against a governmental entity to first
file a signed notice of the claim with the entity in order to avoid
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. 222  Here, while the
mother alleged that both federal question and diversity
jurisdiction were present, she neglected to allege compliance with
the signature and certification requirements of the WGCA on the
face of her complaint, as the statute mandated.2 23 "The district
court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as any
Wyoming court would be required to do," and the mother
Shady Grove has launched: class actions seeking state-created penalties for claims
arising under state law-claims that would be barred from class treatment in the
State's own courts." Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see
Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 76 ("But that irony should not obscure the
underlying similarity between CAFA and Shady Grove. Both developments have
deprived the states of power to pursue visions of the class action that differ from the
federal vision. CAFA was a product of the democratic process, however protracted
and messy. Shady Grove was not.").
218 630 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 95 (2011).
219 Id. at 981.
220 WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-39-101-121 (West 2011).
221 WYO. CONST., art. 16, § 7 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2008 amendments)
(stating, in relevant part, that no claims or demands against the state or any county
or political subdivision shall be paid "until a full itemized statement in writing,
certified to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers" of the
entity).
222 Garman, 630 F.3d at 981.
223 Id.
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appealed, arguing that her complaint complied with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a).224 The Tenth Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals determined that because "Rule 8(a)(1) directly
addresses the requirements for sufficient pleading of jurisdiction
under the notice-pleading standards .... itlhe rule is broad
enough to control the area addressed by Wyoming's pleading
requirements."22 5 Moreover, because the complaint sufficiently
pleaded jurisdiction under the federal rule but the court would
lack jurisdiction if it applied the Wyoming law, "[t]he two rules
are in direct, irreconcilable conflict."2 6 Applying the rationale of
Justice Stevens's concurrence, however, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the suit.22m The court observed that
"[t]he WGCA is the only vehicle through which a claimant may
escape the bar of sovereign immunity in Wyoming."2 The law's
special pleading requirement
is a necessary condition before sovereign immunity is abrogated
under the WGCA as interpreted by the Wyoming Supreme
Court. The rule is part of the substantive law of Wyoming....
Permitting the federal rules to trump substantive Wyoming law
would "abridge, enlarge, or modify" the litigants' rights in
violation of the Rules Enabling Act. Justice Stevens'
concurrence in Shady Grove is critical to our decision as he
concurred in the judgment only because he concluded the rule at
issue was not part of substantive state law. Because we reach
the opposite conclusion here, we likewise reach the opposite
result.22 9
These decisions released in the months following Shady
Grove indicate a willingness by lower federal courts to use
Justice Stevens's test to invalidate a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure under the REA, a procedural step that the Supreme
24 Id. at 980.
225 Id. at 983.
226 Id. at 984.
227 Id. at 986-87.
228 Id. at 984.
229 Id. at 985. Another federal district court considering a similar issue also
determined that Justice Stevens's opinion controls the REA analysis, but reached a
different outcome. In considering whether the plaintiffs failure to meet more
stringent Texas filing requirements stripped the federal court of its jurisdiction, the
court held that the Texas pleading standard was in conflict with the federal pleading
rules and that the federal rules should apply because the obvious purposes of the
state rule were procedural, not substantive. Estate of C.A. v. Grier, 752 F. Supp. 2d
763, 770-71 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
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Court has never taken,230 and one for which even Justice Stevens
believed the bar should be set high.2 3 1 To determine whether the
rationale of these courts could be extended to justify the
application of state summary judgment standards in federal
court, however, we must answer two questions. First, by
diverging from Celotex and adopting a standard for summary
judgment that raises the burden of proof on the moving party
and makes summary judgment more difficult to obtain, have
certain states either conferred a substantive right or remedy on
their citizens or created a procedural rule so intertwined with a
state right or remedy that it helps define the scope of the state-
created right? And, if so, does the forced application of Celotex in
federal courts sitting in diversity in those states "abridge,
enlarge, or modify" those substantive rights conferred by the
states? If we can answer both of these questions affirmatively,
then the application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 to
displace a more restrictive state rule violates § 2072(b), and the
court should apply the state law on summary judgment.
Because most, if not all, procedural rules have some effect on
the value of a party's claim, the mere fact that the procedural
rule might possibly affect a party's substantive rights cannot
form the basis for invalidating that procedural rule.2 32  If
that were the case, the exception (28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)) would
swallow the rule (28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)). In considering whether
the summary judgment standard is one of those state laws, rules,
or standards that, while procedural in nature, is functionally
substantive, it is logical to consider other state rules that courts
230 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442
(2010) (observing that the Court has "rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal
Rule that has come before [it]"). Professors Burbank and Wolff, while acknowledging
the accuracy of this statement in the plurality opinion, suggested that this fact "is
hardly cause for the institutional self-satisfaction that Justice Scalia's opinion
manifests." Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 41. Indeed, the Court's
failure to find a violation of the Enabling Act has frequently been made
possible through Federal Rule interpretations that were restrained without
being enlightened, many of which reflected implicit acknowledgment of the
inadequacy of Sibbach, both in its federalism account of the Enabling Act's
limitations and its narrow view of the substantive rights that are protected.
Id. at 42.
231 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring).
232 Professor Tidmarsh argues that, in fact, "every 'procedural' rule changes
entitlements and values of claims," and thus has some effect on substance, even "the
most quintessentially procedural of all rules-the requirement that pleadings and
motions be filed on 8' x 11' [sic] paper." Tidmarsh, supra note 66, at 891.
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and commentators have deemed candidates to invalidate
conflicting federal rules under § 2072(b). The state rules that led
to invalidation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in Bearden,
McKinney, Whirlpool, and Wellbutrin all placed restrictions on
litigants' abilities to file class action suits to enforce rights
provided under state statutes: consumer protection laws in
Tennessee and Ohio and an antitrust law in Illinois. 233  The
restrictions varied in their origin and scope.234 Their common
characteristic was that they were all interpretations of, or
contained within, the substantive law itself, rather than codified
as separate rules of procedure. The state rule at issue in
Garman, while clearly a procedural requirement, had its basis in
a statute conferring a substantive right-the ability to sue a
governmental entity in Wyoming despite the presumption of
qualified immunity-and, indirectly, the state constitution.235
Commentators have suggested that there are other federal rules
that are ripe for invalidation when state standards conflict.
These include Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)23 6 and federal
rules or statutes governing sufficiency of the evidence or the
allocation of issues to the judge or jury.237 And of course, Justice
233 See In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676-77 (E.D.
Pa. 2010); McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 743, 748-49 (N.D. Ohio
2010); Bearden v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *8, *10
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 16, 2010); In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1:08-WP-65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio July 12,
2010).
234 The Tennessee restriction was found not within the statute, but in a state
supreme court decision interpreting the provisions of that statute. Bearden, 2010
WL 3239285, at *8 (citing Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d
301, 308-11 (Tenn. 2008)). The Ohio restriction was contained in the text of the
statute but did not exclude all class actions, instead permitting them if the violation
was an act or practice declared to be "deceptive or unconscionable." In re Whirlpool
Corp., 2010 WL 2756947, at *1-2 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (West
2011)). The Illinois statute excluded class action antitrust suits by a particular class
of individuals: indirect purchasers. In re Wellbutrin, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 676 (quoting
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(2) (2010)).
235 Garman ex rel. Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977,
980-81 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 95 (2011) (citing WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-39-113(a); WYo. CONST., art. 16, § 7).
236 See generally Kelleher, supra note 37 (arguing that Rule 4(k) abridges,
enlarges, or modifies the substantive right of amenability to jurisdiction, which is a
substantive right conferred by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution).
1 See generally Richard C. Worf, Jr., The Effect of State Law on the Judge-Jury
Relationship in Federal Court, 30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 109 (2009) (positing that, after
Byrd and Gasperini, federal courts should follow state rules in these areas because
they involve powerful substantive interests).
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Stevens, in footnote nine of his concurring opinion, provided
concrete examples of the "many ways in which seemingly
procedural rules may displace a [s]tate's formulation of its
substantive law.""' These included statutes of limitations,2 39
rules regarding burdens of proof,24 0 and rules setting forth the
standard of review for damages on appeal.2 41
Does the burden of proof at the summary judgment stage of
litigation fall into the same category as these other state rules
and statutes? Unlike the other state laws, rules, and standards
that have been cited, any determination of the burden of proof on
summary judgment is, at its core, an interpretation of a state
procedural rule, not of a procedural provision within a state
substantive law. To hold that the federal summary judgment
rule should be invalidated under the REA where the state
standard is different requires, then, an additional step beyond
those taken by the lower courts after Shady Grove. This step,
however, is warranted, because summary judgment involves
issues of burdens of proof, sufficiency of the evidence, and
allocation of issues between the judge and jury that are
substantive in nature.
As discussed, states such as Tennessee, Kentucky, and
Indiana that have declined to adopt the Celotex standard have
changed the burden of production at the summary judgment
stage of litigation.2 42 The party moving for summary judgment
cannot simply point to a lack of evidence presented by the non-
moving party and prevail at the summary judgment stage;
rather, the moving party actually has to offer evidence proving
238 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1453 n.9 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
239 Id. ("[S]tatutes of limitations, although in some sense procedural rules, can
also be understood as a temporal limitation on legally created rights; if this Court
were to promulgate a federal limitations period, federal courts would still, in some
instances, be required to apply state limitations periods.").
240 Id. ("[I]f the federal rules altered the burden of proof in a case, this could
eviscerate a critical aspect-albeit one that deals with how a right is enforced-of a
State's framework of rights and remedies."). In response to this point, Justice Scalia
conceded that burdens of proof may be among those "rare cases [in which] it may be
difficult to determine whether a rule 'really regulates' procedure or substance." Id. at
1446 n.13 (plurality opinion).
241 Id. at 1453 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I]f a federal rule about appellate
review displaced a state rule about how damages are reviewed on appeal, the federal
rule might be pre-empting a state damages cap.") (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Hunmanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)).
242 See supra Part II.B.
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that the non-moving party cannot prove its case. This raises the
burden beyond that which the moving party would have at trial,
and even beyond what that party would have to show if it simply
waited for trial and moved for a directed verdict. And while state
courts have not always been completely forthcoming about their
motivations for rejecting Celotex and raising the bar on summary
judgment,2 43 policies such as fairness and the benefits of having
litigants' claims decided by the trier of fact are inherent within
those decisions.244
Of course, the ultimate burden of proof in any civil action
will still lie with the plaintiff; no variation on the summary
judgment standard can change that. But the close relationship
between summary judgment standards and both burdens of proof
and the sufficiency of evidence lends itself to a strong argument
that a state's summary judgment standard is part of the state's
network of substantive rights and remedies, or at the very least
is so intertwined with those rights that it serves to define
their scope.245 Once that determination is made, it would be
easy for a court to follow Justice Stevens's interpretation of
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) and hold that a federal court's selection of the
Celotex standard instead of the state's standard would abridge,
enlarge, or modify a substantive right conferred by the state.
Thus, the limiting provision of the REA, apparently revived after
Shady Grove, seems to provide a viable route to applying state
summary judgment standards in diversity actions.246
243 Cornett, supra note 127, at 348-49 (opining on the basis for the Tennessee
Supreme Court's decision to decline to follow Celotex and describing the rationale of
other state courts that have done the same).
24 The Kentucky Supreme Court was straightforward regarding its reasons for
rejecting the Celotex standard, stating that it did not view the volume of litigation or
backlog of cases to be a problem in the commonwealth, and that ensuring each
litigant has his or her day in court is more important than the efficiency benefits
that might accrue from an aggressive approach to summary judgment. See Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482-83 (Ky. 1991).
141 See generally Steinman, supra note 6, at 288-93 (considering how imposing
the federal court summary judgment practice might abridge substantive rights).
246 Professor Cooper provides the alternative view:
[S]ummary judgment .. . (when sought against a plaintiff) does not rewrite
the elements of the plaintiffs claim but rather measures the adequacy of
the plaintiffs evidence to determine if a reasonable factfinder could find for
the plaintiff at trial. In this way, summary judgment looks more like part
of the "manner and means" of enforcing a substantive right, and less like
an alteration of the substantive right itself.
Cooper, supra note 6, at 1263.
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B. The Rules of Decision Act Approach
The alternative argument, concededly more difficult after
Shady Grove, is that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not
control the issue in dispute, so a modified, or unguided, Erie
analysis should be used. Professor Steinman has suggested that
for broad Federal Rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 (summary judgment), Rule 23 (class actions), and Rule 8(a)
(pleadings), it is not the Rule itself that sets forth the
federal policy but the judicial interpretation of those rules.2 47 In
Gasperini, for example, the majority of the Court agreed that it
was not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 that controlled the
standard for determining whether punitive damages were
excessive, but rather the "judicial gloss" that federal appellate
courts had placed on the question-that is, whether they
"41248Cordeemndtath
"shocked the conscience. Once the Court determined that the
Federal Rule did not control, and that it could undertake the
modified Erie analysis set forth in the first part of Chief Justice
Warren's opinion in Hanna, it became easy to apply the state
rule. Similarly, if it is indeed the judicial interpretation of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 through case law, and not the
rule itself, that has imposed the federal summary judgment
standard, then this may make for "a surprisingly strong
argument that a federal court's choice between state and federal
law on the[] issue[] should be treated as an unguided one."249 As
in Gasperini, an unguided Erie analysis would weigh strongly in
favor of applying the state summary judgment standard rather
than the federal standard. Based upon. the many practical
differences between Celotex and the divergent state standards,2 50
247 See Steinman, supra note 6; see also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 48-
49 ("Unless a Federal Rule alleged to violate the Enabling Act actually makes a
policy choice that Congress has had an opportunity to review . . . the role that
federal common law plays in providing content that the rulemakers did not
prospectively entertain should be recognized and analyzed accordingly.").
24. Steinman, supra note 6, at 283 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1996)); see also Burbank & Wolff, supra note 37, at 49
(asserting that the Gasperini majority was correct to refuse "to assimilate to Rule 59
a policy choice that its drafters did not make and that federal common law could not
make for state law diversity cases").
249 Steinman, supra note 6, at 282-83.
2 See supra Part II.B.
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it seems clear that applying the state law would undoubtedly
promote the "twin aims" of Erie: to avoid forum shopping and to
prevent the laws from being administered inequitably.2"'
Under this smoother path to the modified Erie analysis
under the RDA, the state law almost certainly would be applied.
However, while this approach may have found some support
based upon Gasperini, its likelihood of success was sharply
reduced by part I-A of Justice Scalia's opinion in Shady Grove,
which obtained the votes of a majority of the Court. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 is written broadly, and it may follow that
its true meaning has been divined not by its language, but by
judicial opinions such as Celotex that have interpreted it.
However, the same could be said about Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, and a majority of the Court held in Shady Grove
that, at least on the facts presented in that case, it was the Rule
itself, and not the decisional law construing that Rule, that
controlled. Given a choice between the RDA and REA arguments
for applying state summary judgment standards, the REA
appears to be the more persuasive of the two, particularly after
Shady Grove.252
251 In pondering the effects of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in
Hannan, Professor Cornett makes a classic argument for applying the state rule
under a modified, or unguided, Erie approach:
Given the now-inarguable divergence between state and federal
summary judgment practice in Tennessee, forum selection decisions take
on added significance. Plaintiffs need to think hard before filing in federal
court if their case would be vulnerable to a Celotex motion. A plaintiff who
needs time to develop proof, or whose expected proof may be comparatively
weaker than the defendant's, is better off in Tennessee state court.
Conversely, a defendant in such a case would be better off in federal
court ....
Cornett, supra note 127, at 348; see also Lind, supra note 17, at 769 (observing that
the net result of differing state and federal summary judgment standards "is to
make it much more likely that a defendant in federal court will obtain summary
judgment than a defendant in state court[,] [which] becomes a powerful motive for
defendant forum-shopping and another reason why tort reformers want to redirect
tort litigation to the federal forum"); Pertnoy, supra note 182, at 83 (arguing that
Florida's distinct summary judgment standard "is an affront to the dual aims of the
Erie doctrine").
252 A recently unsuccessful petition for writ of certiorari emphasized the RDA
argument rather than the REA argument. The petitioner argued that in determining
whether state or federal law controls, "focus must be on the decisional law applying
Rule 56 and that the decisional law does not amend or re-codify previous
codification." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Medison Am., Inc. v. Preferred Med.
Sys., L.L.C., 131 S. Ct. 101 (2010); see also id. at 9 ("All of these issues are addressed
only in decisional law from federal and Tennessee courts, making the conflict
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CONCLUSION
After Shady Grove, the modern Erie doctrine continues to be
in a state of flux. The replacement of the most influential vote in
Shady Grove, Justice Stevens, with Justice Elena Kagan makes
the outcome of the Court's next Erie case even less predictable.
Moreover, the voting patterns in Shady Grove, which belied the
conventional alliances on the Court, make it difficult to ascertain
the direction that the Court's Erie jurisprudence might take.
Suffice it to say that, for now, a majority of the Court is inclined
to construe a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure broadly to displace
arguably competing state rules. However, a single concurring
voice in Shady Grove has opened the door for invalidation of a
federal rule where it abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive
state right, any possibility heretofore only existed in theory. A
court's decision to grant or deny a summary judgment motion
involves issues such as burdens of proof, sufficiency of the
evidence, and the allocation of responsibilities between judge and
jury, thus arguably making it either part of the network of
substantive rights conferred by states on their citizens or so tied
up with those rights as to render it functionally substantive.
This makes summary judgment an ideal battleground for the
next step in the Court's Erie jurisprudence. It remains to be seen
whether, in the meantime, the lower federal courts will continue
to walk through the door that Justice Stevens's REA analysis has
opened.
between state and codified federal law existing in Hanna, nonexistent in this case,
making the REA inapplicable."). Several of the lower court decisions adopting
Justice Stevens's REA analysis as controlling, and applying state rules based upon
the REA approach, have been issued since the Court denied the cert petition in
Medison.
253 Although Justice Kagan taught Civil Procedure at Harvard Law School, none
of her academic writings, which focus primarily on the First Amendment and
Administrative Law, shed light on her Erie leanings. See Tom Goldstein, 9750 Words
on Elena Kagan, SCOTUSBLOG (May 8, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2010/05/9750-words-on-elena-kagan/.
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